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INTRODUCTION 
Public Sector Collective Bargaining 
and the Imperative for Service 
Delivery: An Overview 
JONATHAN BROCK 
University of Washington 
DAVID B. LIPSKY 
Cornell University 
In the last 15 years, significant forces have affected public sector 
labor-management relations in the United States. The primary forces 
have pressed for increased efficiency and improved services—in terms 
of both quahty and delivery. Other -forces, however, have pressed for a 
smaller government presence and for privatization of many government 
responsibilities. Similar forces have affected other industrialized coun-
tries. 
Lorenzo Bordogna examines this comparison with regard to non-U.S. 
industrialized countries in the first chapter of this volume, noting that 
most other industrialized countries started out with a larger public sector 
and more state-run enterprises, greater union density, more-pervasive 
use of participative models, and broader labor rights. He describes 
efforts in many of those countries to reduce the influence and indepen-
dence of collective bargaining, often by shifting wage-setting authority to 
the employer or by increasing the role of centralized settlements. His 
basic conclusion is that pressures on governments are becoming similar 
to pressures in the private sector: to provide better services, reduce 
employment, improve applications of information technology, and "pri-
vatize" or subcontract work. 
Privatization is usually viewed in the United States as a serious threat 
to public sector unions. Yet even though there was considerable interest 
in privatization during the 1990s, public sector employment actually 
grew overall during that period. Marick Masters and Robert Albright 
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inform us in their chapter that there was a decline in federal employ-
ment, but that it was not specifically the result of privatization. Bi-
partisan support for a smaller federal government during the Clinton 
administration led to the federal decrease, but it was outweighed by state 
and local sector growth. 
Terry Thomason and John Burton's research indicates that wide-
spread interest in privatization did not on balance affect U.S. public sec-
tor employment growth and union density during the past two decades. 
In their chapter they show that both public sector employment and pub-
lic sector union membership grew by 25 percent over the period 1983-
2002 and that, consequently, union density (the proportion of employees 
who are union members) remained relatively stable over this period, 
within the range of 36-39 percent. They also show, however, that privati-
zation has had some significant effects in several important public sector 
functions, including health care and education. In the hospital industry, 
for example, the public share of employment declined from about 25 
percent to about 13 percent over the past 20 years. The public share of 
employment in education also declined, by about six percentage points. 
Privatization apparently led to lower union density in hospitals, but in 
education it did not. Because in the private sector union density steadily 
declined over the past 20 years, the importance of public sector unions 
as a segment of organized labor has steadily increased. In 2002 public 
sector union membership constituted over 46 percent of total union 
membership in the United States. 
These pressures and patterns have created some responses that are 
unique to the United States. One has been the formation of collabora-
tive, service-oriented relationships, which have shown substantial evi-
dence of reducing costs, improving service, improving the quality of 
work life, and markedly changing the nature of the bargaining relation-
ship. Collaboration represents a potential answer to pressures for in-
creased efficiency and improved service quality, even though it does not 
significantly address the more political or ideological calls for less gov-
ernment and more privatization. Although still very much the exception, 
service-focused, cooperative relationships show promise for improving 
labor-management relations and the climate surrounding the role of 
unions in the public workplace. They thus represent a significant and 
useful response to the pressures on government and on unions of public 
employees. Such relationships are still new enough, however, that it is 
difficult to judge their efficacy or to predict the factors that might sustain 
them and help them succeed. 
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The basic premise of such relationships is not new. Effective labor-
management interaction requires a relationship that goes beyond con-
tract negotiation and grievance handling and allows the parties to solve 
problems of mutual importance that occur between bargaining rounds. 
Even early works such as Slichter, Healy, and Livemash recognized the 
importance of informal dealings in oiling the labor-management rela-
tionship and promoting problem solving (Slichter, Healy, and Livernash 
1960:841-78). Many of the more-traditional relationships that have led 
to respectful and productive interaction and have produced effective 
service and work-life improvements have done so without moving to an 
explicitly cooperative model, however. Both explicit and implicit cooper-
ative relationships appear to require quality leadership, mutual trust and 
respect, stability over time, recognition of common interests, and an at-
mosphere that acknowledges the legitimacy of differing opinions. 
Given the nearly universal pressures on public employees and public 
employee unions to improve the efficiency and quality of public services, 
this volume focuses principally on the growing and promising practice of 
cooperative relationships. It is part of an ongoing IRRA series on public 
sector employment relations.1 Our volume seeks to explore the pro-
spects, ingredients, and key issues surrounding this nontraditional ap-
proach to labor-management relations. It also explores other important 
issues related to the state of public sector labor relations, such as union 
density and the inclusion of supervisors in bargaining units—the latter 
being a long-standing topic of debate in the field. 
Most of the authors in this volume share the view that the expanded 
use of more-collaborative, service-oriented approaches to public sector 
labor-management relations would be valuable. As the practice expands 
and matures, additional research will be required to help determine its 
specific value and effects. The parties will need to learn to understand 
the ingredients associated with successful collaborative relationships, the 
effects of political and economic pressure on them, the prospects for 
such relationships to weather changes in leadership, and the effect of 
collaboration on their roles as advocates. We hope this volume serves to 
stimulate research on this important phenomenon. 
For now, it appears that, while cooperative relationships are difficult 
to initiate, they do indeed both contribute to the quality of services re-
ceived by the public and enhance employee satisfaction. Evidence in this 
volume also suggests that cooperation enhances the value of the union to 
employees and makes the jobs of union leaders more interesting. Coop-
eration also leads to increased flexibility, usually benefiting all parties, 
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and reduces the cost per unit of service. It can also help to avert layoffs, 
even as productivity and quality improve, and under the right circum-
stances it can confer political benefits to both management and union 
leaders. But, as several authors in this volume note, cooperation entails 
risk and risk taking by both parties. 
Public Sector Labor-Management Relations 
Collective bargaining in the public sector grew dramatically in the 
1960s and early 1970s. During that period many states passed statutes 
supporting the right of public sector employees to join unions and 
engage in collective bargaining. These statutes significantly mirrored 
statutes governing the private sector, but strikes were generally prohib-
ited and impasse procedures differed across jurisdictions. From the start 
it was widely recognized that labor-management relations in the public 
sector existed in an environment that was inherently political. As Well-
ington and Winter wrote, "Collective bargaining by public employees 
and the political process cannot be separated. The costs of such bargain-
ing, therefore, cannot be fully measured without taking into account the 
impact on the allocation of political power in the typical [jurisdiction]" 
(Wellington and Winter 1971:31). Although private sector unions and 
employers are certainly involved in the political process (they are often 
active participants in lobbying and election campaigns, for example), 
their involvement is vastly different from that of public sector unions and 
employers. In the public sector, unions not only engage in lobbying activ-
ities and campaigns for elected officials, they typically deal with these 
officials across the bargaining table as well. 
The politics of public sector bargaining significantly affected the 
nature of the rights granted to unions, the character of union organizing, 
the strategies of contract negotiation, and other factors. The difference 
between the bargaining dynamic in the public sector and the private sec-
tor is more significant than those who created most public sector bar-
gaining statutes generally contemplated (Kheel 1999:105-06). 
Public sector bargaining statutes reflect one major difference be-
tween the public and private sectors. Public sector statutes in most juris-
dictions established boards or commissions that have responsibility for 
four basic activities: resolving representation issues, deciding improper 
practices, managing conciliation and dispute resolution procedures, and 
handling other regulatory matters. In most segments of the private sec-
tor, however—those governed by the Taft-Hartley Act—the responsibil-
ity for representation issues and improper practices is separated from 
THE IMPERATIVE FOB SERVICE DELIVERY: OVERVIEW 5 
dispute resolution and conciliation procedures: the former resides in the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), while the latter resides largely 
in the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS). 
Regrettably, because little attention has been paid to state boards 
and commissions in the recent research literature, we know relatively 
little about their current status and effectiveness or their influence on 
the practice of labor-management relations within and beyond their 
jurisdictions. It is ironic that so httle is known because, collectively, state 
boards and commissions monitor the rights of almost as many repre-
sented workers as does the NLRB. Leaders of boards and commissions 
have reported that they have been burdened by both increases in work-
load and reductions in resources and constrained by political factors that 
influence the appointment of their members. Board and commission 
representatives tell a story of significant staff turnover and great diffi-
culty in performing their functions effectively.2 
Martin Malin points out, in his chapter on public sector labor law and 
labor-management cooperation, that labor relations in the public sector 
has a tradition of being highly litigious and process oriented. In a typical 
relationship, the parties devote significant amounts of time to arguments 
over alleged violations of their respective rights and disputes over the 
scope of bargaining. The dominant activities in many (but certainly not 
all) traditional relationships are arguments between the parties over issues 
that ultimately need to be resolved in legal forums (boards, commissions, 
and courts) or in other settings (arbitration hearings, regulatory agencies) 
that rely on lawyers and other specialists who are not involved in service 
delivery and do not have to live with the outcomes of these proceedings. 
Malin, Masters and Albright, and Charles Kerchner all say that per-
sistent arguments over substantive and procedural rights are clearly not 
productive. (By implication, other contributors to this volume make the 
same point.) They suggest that expanding the scope of the parties' ongo-
ing discussions and focusing greater attention on the quality of work life 
would help foster both constructive relationships and better public ser-
vices. Malin notes that in authentic collaborative relationships most of 
the interactions between the parties are devoted to improving the qual-
ity of service delivery, reducing the costs of delivery, and improving the 
quality of work life. 
Requirements of a Collaborative Relationship 
The key to an effective collaborative relationship is that both parties 
become aware of, and assume responsibility for, issues that are traditionally 
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the responsibility of only one of them. In these relationships public sector 
employers focus more on the quality of their employees' work life and 
public sector unions focus more on improving the quality of public ser-
vices. If the parties are willing to move in these directions, then even 
within the current restrictive statutory framework they can overcome 
wasteful legal disputes that sour their relationships. In fact, even in tradi-
tional relationships that are free of such wasteful disputes, the evidence 
presented by the authors in this volume suggests that a collaborative, ser-
vice-oriented approach can enhance the parties' relationships and assist in 
carrying out their respective responsibilities. 
Malin makes a modest proposal: he suggests that requiring consulta-
tion between the parties on issues normally considered to be beyond the 
scope of bargaining would help solve service-delivery and workplace 
problems and reduce the number of disputes ending up in legal forums. 
Kerchner and Malin believe that expanding the scope of the discussions 
between the parties would have desirable effects. Nearly all current 
cooperative relationships—in which the scope of discussions is by defin-
ition broad—exist under preexisting statutory frameworks in which the 
formal scope of bargaining is narrow. A legal regime that is more 
encouraging and protective of cooperation—such as that proposed by 
Malin or Kerchner—might foster the acceptance, diffusion, and sustain-
ability of these relationships.3 
If the parties confine their interactions to those required by statute, 
they are unlikely to be able to deal jointly and effectively with issues 
affecting either the delivery of services or the quality of work life. They 
are more likely to become entrapped in the arcane and often absurd dis-
putes Malin documents. In traditional relationships in which the parties 
are able to develop informal channels of communication based on mutual 
trust, they have a better chance of dealing with more fundamental issues. 
They would seem to have an even greater chance in a more complete 
form of cooperative relations. When teachers are precluded from partici-
pating in curriculum discussions, Kerchner would argue, the result is 
bound to be substandard and impractical. When sanitation truck drivers 
and mechanics are not consulted about mechanization and new equip-
ment purchases, the result will likewise be inadequate. When social work-
ers cannot offer advice to agency managers about new policy issues or a 
new information system, the treatment of families in crisis and the flow of 
information within the agency are likely to be weakened. When well-
trained professionals are not consulted by their managers, they are likely 
to feel that they are not respected and to have their dignity undermined. 
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The lack of consultation and cooperation will lead to increasing levels of 
frustration as governments become increasingly dependent on "knowl-
edge workers" (to use Peter Drucker's well-known term). 
If the parties want to broaden the scope of their discussions beyond 
strict statutory requirements, they must be willing to take risks and do 
the difficult work of building and maintaining trust. Only when each 
party is willing to learn about the other's internal culture and leadership 
pressures can ways be found to expand their interactions. Both public 
sector managers and union leaders are often risk-averse, however, and 
either unable or unwilling to broaden their perspectives beyond a tradi-
tional definition of their roles and responsibilities. Perhaps it is not sur-
prising, then, that developing cooperative and trusting relationships is 
such a difficult undertaking. Moreover, even when management and 
union leaders are able to overcome the barriers to developing coopera-
tive relationships, turnover in the leadership ranks can obliterate the 
gains they have made. Union and management officials sometimes 
become champions of innovations in labor-management relations, but in 
these cases, when the champion leaves the organization, the innovation 
often dies. When union and management leaders successfully reach 
agreements that incorporate innovative practices, their successors may 
abandon those agreements.4 Thus, adopting labor-management coopera-
tion is a difficult challenge, but institutionalizing the practice is even 
more so. 
What can unions and employers do to institutionalize the practice of 
labor-management cooperation? The chapters in this volume, as well as 
our own professional experiences, suggest that several steps can be 
taken. Institutionalization usually requires a concerted effort to change 
the culture of the relationship. It may help, for example, if a new pro-
gram is embedded in the collective bargaining contract. Also useful is 
the commitment of the parties to invest in joint education and training 
programs. The more fully employees and managers understand the 
process of collaboration, including the risks involved, the greater the 
likelihood of success. Institutionalization ultimately depends on accep-
tance of the new approach by all stakeholders: rank-and-file union mem-
bers, first-line supervisors, middle managers, and elected officials. Efforts 
must be made during transitions to show new leaders, on both sides of 
the table, the benefits of a collaborative system. Moreover, a communi-
cation strategy designed to keep key internal and external stakeholders 
fully informed is a valuable component of any effort to institutionalize 
innovative practices. 
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Labor and management representatives will likely change their atti-
tudes about cooperation if they observe that cooperative relationships 
produce positive results, including not only improvements in service 
delivery and the quality of work life but also in their own relationships 
with one another. Mayors and governors appear to be swayed by service 
results that help them do their jobs and maintain political capital. Posi-
tive results will then probably lead to greater commitment to cooperative 
systems. Sonia Ospina and Allon Yaroni, in their chapter on the changing 
role of labor and management leaders, describe the skills leaders need to 
sustain an effective relationship in this new mode. They note that union 
leaders who seem to be successful have more involvement with budgets 
and systems, and management leaders who seem to be successful deal 
more effectively with human and emotional issues in the workplace. 
Developing the reciprocal responsibilities required in cooperative rela-
tionships results from a conscious effort to implement a joint decision-
making structure and to avoid the legalistic approach Malin decries. 
Government Support versus Government Barriers 
Although the steps just described may help sustain an innovation, it is 
less clear how a successful collaborative system can be diffused from one 
location to others. Statutory changes of the type proposed by Malin 
might help, but it is clearly difficult to achieve the passage of new public 
sector bargaining laws. Only a couple of states have done so recently. In 
March 2003, New Mexico passed a law reinstating collective bargaining 
rights for teachers and other public employees; the previous public 
employee bargaining law had expired under a sunset provision in 1999.5 
Also in 2003, the State of Washington passed a law that allows state em-
ployees to bargain over wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment but at the same time liberalizes the possibilities for con-
tracting out.6 
At the federal level, though, recent history has been different. The 
Clinton administration adopted the concept of labor-management coop-
eration and the president issued Executive Order 12871 in 1993, estab-
lishing the National Partnership Council (NPC) and "mandating that 
federal agency and department heads partner with their unions to im-
prove government service and performance" (Clinton 1993). Masters 
and Albright observe that this initiative was arguably successful, or at 
the very least promising. Immediately after taking office in 2001, how-
ever, President Bush revoked Executive Order 12871 and dissolved the 
NPC. The new administration steered federal sector labor relations in a 
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different direction—away from cooperation and toward the restoration 
of traditional adversarial approaches. Most noteworthy was the Bush 
administration's insistence that employees of the two new agencies cre-
ated in the wake of September 11, 2001—the Department of Homeland 
Security and the Transportation Security Administration—should not 
have the right to engage in collective bargaining. Many national unions 
reacted to the Bush administration's new approach by even further 
reducing the priority they attach to labor-management cooperation in 
their strategic plans.7 
The Stance of Umbrella Organizations 
How do union and management organizations and government 
boards and commissions—at the national or state or regional level—view 
collaboration? Traditional functions in public sector collective bargaining, 
such as contract negotiations, dispute resolution, and grievance handling, 
have by-and-large been standardized across many jurisdictions and, 
accordingly, have become predictable and familiar. Institutions and prac-
tices that support these functions have grown up around them. Collabora-
tive practices seem to be more idiosyncratic, at least for now. They are 
rarely taught or encouraged in venues where most advocates, negotiators, 
and practitioners receive formal or informal training. As a task force 
appointed by the Secretary of Labor noted in 1996, law schools, schools 
of pubhc administration, and other professional graduate institutions sel-
dom teach about the cooperative approach or, indeed, about pubhc sector 
practices more generally (U.S. Department of Labor 1996). Likewise, 
cooperation is not usually included as a substantial portion of the agenda 
of pubhc sector unions or professional association meetings. Fostering 
cooperative relationships is not generally a part of the responsibihties of 
state boards and commissions. The budgets for these boards and commis-
sions almost never include funds to foster collaborative relationships even 
though these bodies are in a prime position to recognize parties that are 
in need of help in developing new approaches. There are some important 
exceptions, however—some state boards and, notably, the FMCS will 
help parties seeking assistance to develop cooperative approaches. 
The ranks of both labor and management leaders at the national level 
typically do not place collaborative relationships high on their agendas. 
In fact, there is some evidence at the national level of wariness of coop-
erative approaches. The perceptions and attitudes of the leaders of these 
umbrella organizations affect the willingness and preparation of local 
labor and management leaders to attempt a cooperative approach. 
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The national and international unions in the United States that have 
significant public sector representation showed some interest in promot-
ing the collaborative approach during the mid-1990s, but most have 
omitted it from their strategic priorities since then. Although there are 
important exceptions, many local and national leaders on both sides do 
not even consider it a viable choice for dealing with the pressures and 
changes they are experiencing. A strong lore exists that labor-manage-
ment cooperation frequently results in betrayal or embarrassment (in the 
form of layoffs, for example, or changes in authority relationships). 
Mutual trust is a necessary ingredient for sustaining cooperative relation-
ships, but trust is much harder to achieve and sustain than such tradi-
tional practices as the periodic renegotiation of new contracts and the 
arbitration of unresolved grievances. As a result most national unions in 
the United States give priority to sustaining current membership levels, 
organizing nonmembers, and engaging in political activity as methods of 
advancing the status of their unions and attach a much lower priority to 
the promotion of labor-management cooperation. The major national-
level management associations have also not expressed strong support 
for labor-management cooperation. Although there is serious interest at 
the top levels of the International Personnel Management Association 
and some support among the staff of several other management organi-
zations, there is no evidence that the senior leaders of most management 
organizations are champions of cooperation. Is there hope for labor-man-
agement cooperation if the leaders of the national unions and manage-
ment associations do not attach a high priority to it? 
Evidence in this volume, as well as in .the 1996 report of the Secre-
tary of Labor's Task Force (U.S. DOL 1996), shows that adopting labor-
management cooperation is almost always a local decision. Such a move 
is generally made only after the occurrence of a crisis, often accompa-
nied by a change in local leadership, when a non-confrontational approach 
has more immediate appeal. The key decision makers are the chief exec-
utives and elected officials of schools, cities, counties, and other jurisdic-
tions, on the one hand, and local union leaders and their constituents, on 
the other. So the support of national-level organizations might be helpful 
with the diffusion of such relationships, but it does not appear to be 
essential to their establishment or effectiveness. 
There have been instances, however, when a national union, such as 
the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees or 
the Service Employees International Union, has provided assistance to lo-
cal affiliates seeking to reform their relationship with their management 
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counterparts. These interventions by the national unions have usually had 
beneficial effects on local relationships. At the federal level, the National 
Treasury Employees' Union (NTEU) and the American Federation of 
Government Employees have also encouraged cooperative approaches. 
Masters and Albright describe how the major unions representing federal 
employees actively embraced labor-management cooperation during the 
Clinton administration. 
Likewise, in those cases where public employee relations commis-
sions and boards or public sector management associations have encour-
aged collaborative relationships, their support appears to have made a 
difference, particularly in relationships characterized by frequent dis-
putes and impasses. The role these activist boards and the FMCS have 
played in encouraging cooperative relationships demonstrates the value 
of intervention and support services by a neutral agency. 
In the field of education, both major teacher unions—the American 
Federation of Teachers (AFT) and the National Education Association 
(NEA)— have advocated teachers' playing a greater role in guaranteeing 
and improving the quality of education. As Kerchner states, "Increas-
ingly unions are realizing that their role is to negotiate on behalf of 
teaching as well as teachers." The NEA grew out of efforts by teachers in 
the early part of the twentieth century to form a professional association. 
Until the 1960s, most members of the NEA did not regard their organiza-
tion as a union and did not believe it should formally endorse collective 
bargaining. The AFT, by contrast, was clearly a union from its inception 
and promoted the use of collective bargaining. When collective bargain-
ing took root in public education in the 1960s, the rivalry between the 
NEA and the AFT was often manifested in a debate about whether 
teachers' interests were best promoted by a professional association or a 
union. Eventually, of course, the NEA did increasingly behave like a 
union and begin to be aggressive about pursuing members' rights. But 
the debate over the most effective form of teacher representation contin-
ues today. Are teachers professionals in the same sense as doctors, 
lawyers, and accountants? Or are they more like other employees in pub-
he sector bureaucracies? If one assumes the former, then a teacher union 
should be more like a professional association; if one assumes the latter, 
then a teacher union should be more like an industrial union. 
Meanwhile, while teachers were debating their most effective form of 
representation, the public became increasingly concerned about the qual-
ity of education provided by the nation's schools. Particularly after the 
1983 publication of A Nation at Risk (U.S. Department of Education 
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1983), a study sponsored by the Reagan administration, alarm about the 
deteriorating quality of public education increased dramatically. In 
response to the public's concern, both the NEA and the AFT "officially 
put themselves in the quality education business," as Kerchner says. Pur-
suing this theme even further, if teacher unions are going to play a signif-
icant role in improving the quality of education, should they define their 
role as more analogous to professional associations or to industrial 
unions? Kerchner believes neither is appropriate and proposes a differ-
ent approach. He believes that the more deeply teacher unions become 
involved in the delivery and quality of educational services, the more 
they begin to resemble the guilds of the Middle Ages—organizations of 
skilled craftsmen that were formed to enhance and protect the standards 
of the products their members produced. The collaborative approach, 
with a focus on service delivery, appears to allow attention to both the 
quality of work life and the quality of the educational product. 
Conceiving of teacher organizations as either professional or indus-
trial unions is not sufficient, Kerchner argues, because both forms of 
unionism focus on improving teachers' compensation and other terms 
and conditions of employment and relegate the quality of education to a 
lower priority. Kerchner also notes that in most school districts union 
leaders and the teachers they represent are a more stable group in the 
local system than the superintendents and principals who manage the 
schools and that the turnover of elected union leaders is usually lower 
than that of elected school board members. Both these factors serve to 
enhance the value of the guild approach. Furthermore, as teacher unions 
have increasingly focused on improving the quality of education, they 
have become more like the medieval guilds, even if most teachers are 
unaware of it. One measure Kerchner believes would encourage guildlike 
behavior of teacher unions would be to make educational quality a 
mandatory subject of bargaining. 
The Benefits of a Collaborative Approach 
The former president of the NTEU, Robert Tobias, suggests in his 
contribution to this volume that the collaborative approach has been 
crucial to attracting and engaging union membership in recent times. 
NTEU's membership consists not only of federal employees in more tra-
ditional "pink-collar" occupations but also of doctors, lawyers, accoun-
tants and auditors, and other professionals employed by federal agencies. 
He discusses the success the NTEU has had in gaining new members in 
spite of the absence of such union security provisions as the union shop 
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or the agency shop. Between 1982 and 2000 the NTEU grew from 
55,000 to 71,000 members, an increase of 29 percent, while most other 
federal sector unions suffered declines in their memberships. Tobias 
believes his union's impressive gains are a consequence of its emphasis 
on cooperative, service-oriented relationships. 
In another chapter, Stephen Goldsmith, a former mayor of Indi-
anapolis, describes how efforts in his city to promote labor-management 
cooperation resulted in lower tax rates, better public services, and im-
provements in his city's budget. The Indianapolis story, Goldsmith main-
tains, is not about privatization—for which he is incorrectly credited or 
pilloried in the popular literature on public labor relations—but about a 
carefully developed labor-management partnership that resulted in ben-
efits for all parties: higher wages, reduced costs, better service, better 
jobs, improved job security, and gain-sharing bonuses. Goldsmith tells of 
entering office with the idea of privatizing the city's services but soon 
coming to realize that collaboration was a more effective strategy. He 
was strongly opposed by most of the local unions at the beginning, but by 
the end of his first term in office he received their support in his bid for 
reelection. Although most observers note the risks to politicians of pro-
moting collaboration, Goldsmith's story illustrates the potential political 
gains of service-oriented partnerships. 
Goldsmith suggests that the path to a cooperative relationship 
depends on local circumstances. Union and management officials need 
to tailor their relationship so that it fits the environment in which they 
operate and serves each party's goals. Generally, successful collaboration 
requires the formation of better and broader forums for discussion, an 
ongoing commitment to training, a chief executive who has compassion 
for the welfare of his employees, and union leaders who have a genuine 
interest in improving the quality and lowering the costs of the services 
their members deliver. Goldsmith describes how he exercised leadership 
in establishing goals and defining standards used to judge improvement 
in his city's financial health. He worked diligentiy with union leaders to 
develop a relationship in which both the City of Indianapolis and its 
unions could contribute to achieving mutually beneficial results. As a 
consequence of this collaboration between the city's officials and its 
unions, taxes were reduced, gain-sharing bonuses were regularly distrib-
uted, and layoffs were minimized. Goldsmith's chapter offers valuable 
insights into how elected officials can establish and maintain the kind of 
labor-management relationships that serve the purposes of both munici-
palities and unions. 
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Risks of Collaboration 
Several contributors to this volume note the risks union leaders 
assume when they foster cooperative relationships with management. For 
example, Jeffrey Keefe recalls that a major corporation laid off a very 
large number of employees in the late 1990s following cooperative efforts 
by their union leaders to accommodate management's needs. Both Keefe, 
and Masters and Albright, writing separately about public sector labor 
relations at the local and federal level, respectively, note the sense of 
betrayal felt by many union leaders when cooperation is followed by sig-
nificant layoffs or other negative consequences for workers and their 
unions. Masters and Albright remind us that the establishment of the 
NPC during the Clinton administration was followed by major reductions 
in force of federal employees and ultimately by President Bush's decision 
to abolish the NPC. These cases certainly do not prove causality, but they 
illustrate that the levels of instability and uncertainty of the cooperative 
model usually exceed the levels associated with more-conventional labor-
management relations. Even when cooperation appears to fail in other re-
lationships, and not in one's own backyard, Keefe argues, such failures 
dampen enthusiasm for undertaking the risks involved in collaboration. 
The forces impeding collaboration in the public sector are real and 
powerful. In the 1996 IRRA research volume, Richard Freeman (1996: 
76-78) reported on a survey about public and private sector employee atti-
tudes toward cooperation. On the one hand, he found that a majority of 
union members in both sectors believed that their unions could only be 
effective if management cooperated with them. On the other hand, he 
found that "public sector union members were almost twice as likely (40% 
vs. 23%) as private sector union members to prefer an organization with 
power that management opposed [over an organization without power 
that management cooperated with] and considerably less certain (60% vs. 
75%) that management cooperation was the sine qua non of effective 
employee organizations." What accounts for this difference? Freeman 
wrote, "One plausible explanation consonant with the way in which the 
two sectors operate, rests on the fact that public sector employees have 
greater power outside collective bargaining to affect management deci-
sions than do private sector employees. They have this power through the 
political process: They are voters and, through unions, a force in electing 
public sector leaders; whereas in the private sector, workers rarely are 
shareholders who can vote and appoint management" (Freeman 1996:78). 
The recent peak in the cyclical interest in privatization may serve to 
motivate public sector unions and their members to undertake the risks 
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associated with cooperation. Ironically, labor's reluctance to risk collabo-
ration and management's unwillingness to expand discussions with 
unions beyond the formal scope of bargaining decrease the opportunities 
the parties have to improve the quality and reduce the costs of public 
services. There is ample evidence in this volume and elsewhere that 
union reluctance to engage in cooperation ultimately diminishes the 
public s perception (and perhaps the reality) of the value of unions in the 
public workplace. By the same token, management's reluctance leads to 
missing the advantages that Goldsmith and others have noted. 
An issue that was widely discussed in the early years of public sector 
bargaining has been thought to carry with it a special risk of collabora-
tion. That is the issue of including supervisors in the same bargaining 
units with rank-and-file employees, which is the topic of a chapter by 
Adrienne Eaton and Paula Voos in this volume. The core risk question is 
whether this creates a conflict of interest for supervisors by pitting their 
loyalty to their union against their obligation to maintain discipline. 
Public sector supervisors are commonly entitled to join unions and 
engage in collective bargaining, in contrast to supervisors and managers 
in the private sector. In some jurisdictions supervisors have separate bar-
gaining units but in others they are included in the same unit as their sub-
ordinates. A number of observers have feared that including supervisors 
and their subordinates in the same bargaining unit would hamper effec-
tive supervision and make collective bargaining more complicated. The 
research done by Eaton and Voos suggests, however, that in the units 
included in their sample there was little practical difficulty in having 
supervisors in broader bargaining units. Their research showed that "if 
problems arose, they did so in the highly unusual context of a work stop-
page or around the nonroutine issue of discipline." They found that the 
problems encountered could be accommodated and concluded that, 
"People can wear two hats. People can be loyal to the mission of the 
agency (and act as supervisors to further that mission), while they are also 
union members," 
There are several other potential risks to both management and 
union officials in adopting a cooperative approach: the dangers of leaving 
familiar turf and being stuck out on a limb, of misjudging the opponent 
and losing face, or of failing to deliver on promises and being faced with 
dire choices. The most incendiary risk is probably privatization. While 
privatization seems to be a real threat to unions and has been a major 
factor in other industrial democracies with larger public sectors and 
more state enterprise, its impact in the United States has actually been 
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remarkably small. The Bush administration, however, has specifically 
called for greater privatization of federal services (as have others before 
it). It is too soon to tell now what the effect of President Bush's push for 
privatization will be, but previous initiatives have had limited results. 
The Secretary of Labor's Task Force reported that almost every in-
stance of labor-management cooperation resulted in significant cost sav-
ings, even with stable employment levels, and thus blunted the call for 
privatization. Some evidence shows that few jurisdictions, other than 
newly incorporated cities, have, in fact, embarked on wholesale privatiza-
tion (U.S. DOL 1996:13-25). In public education, some school districts 
are experimenting with various forms of privatization, but the major 
teacher unions are clearly betting that schools and education will be bet-
ter off in public hands. 
Other factors make it difficult for local labor leaders to engage in 
cooperative relationships. Keefe points out that they face a triple threat. 
First, they may lose member support if the members feel they are too 
close to management and too involved in collaborative efforts. Second, 
they can seldom expect to get support for cooperative efforts from their 
national or regional bodies. Third, they face the possibility that their 
commitment to cooperation will be followed by management decisions, 
such as layoffs and reductions in force, that leave them looking like 
dupes. Goldsmith notes that managers in the public sector face a parallel 
set of risks, but Tobias suggests that the risks to the parties of not work-
ing together may exceed the risks of cooperation, particularly in the face 
of falling public confidence in government. 
Public sector managers and union leaders are always engaged in a 
balancing act, weighing the risk of cooperation failing against their 
obligation to serve the best interests of their constituents. In truth, on a 
long-term basis, continuing conventional labor-management relation-
ships may prove to be as risky as attempting to move to cooperation. 
The conventional approach can result in arcane and wasteful conflicts, 
and, as Malin notes, it necessarily limits employee involvement and 
motivation to improve the delivery of public services. Accordingly, it 
reduces the potential contribution public employees can make to their 
communities. Arthur Hamilton, former president of the National Con-
ference of State Legislatures and a member of the Secretary of Labors 
Task Force, was fond of saying that in bringing about change in the 
labor-management relationship, "Someone has to risk first." Union lead-
ers and managers may want to keep that statement as the fulcrum of 
their balancing act. 
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Summary 
When public sector officials and union leaders are willing to enter 
into cooperative arrangements, the evidence in this volume and else-
where suggests they usually find that cooperation results in improve-
ments in both the delivery of public services and the quality of work life. 
Certainly there have been instances when cooperation has failed to pro-
duce desirable results, but this volume includes ample testimony to its 
potential beneficial effects and depicts successful experiences with coop-
eration at the federal government level, in a number of state govern-
ments, in Indianapolis, and elsewhere. Also, we know that in places such 
as Los Angeles; Phoenix; Portland, Maine; Toledo, Ohio; Cincinnati, 
Ohio; and numerous other locales the cooperative approach has achieved 
positive results (U.S. DOL 1996). Yet cooperation in the public sector 
remains the exception rather than the rule. 
Why is this? Entering into cooperative relationships requires a willing-
ness by the parties to engage in risk-taking behavior. Public sector unions 
and managers are usually reluctant to undertake the risks necessary to 
establish cooperative relationships and prefer the comfort of traditional 
and familiar approaches. Both management and union bureaucracies tend 
to be conservative in the sense that they ordinarily prefer the status quo. 
Moreover, public sector bargaining statutes, which were mostly enacted in 
the turbulent 1960s—and the practices that emerged around them— 
serve to enshrine the traditional, adversarial approach to labor-manage-
ment relations rather than to promote cooperation. At the national level 
both unions and management organizations usually place a higher priority 
on other objectives (organizing and engaging in lobbying and political 
activity, for example) and consider cooperation to be a less-significant pri-
ority. The pursuit of cooperation is also affected by political and ideologi-
cal factors. The election of a new mayor or a new union leader sometimes 
destroys efforts by previous leaders to establish cooperative relations. 
Nevertheless, there are union and public officials who have been 
willing to undertake the risks necessary to embark on a cooperative path. 
Often cooperation between the parties has arisen as the consequence of 
a crisis—one that may be related to fiscal distress, for example. Occasion-
ally cooperation follows a disappointing effort to privatize public services. 
Cooperation may also occur when union leaders and public officials 
come to believe that it serves their respective political interests. And 
there are instances when enlightened public sector managers and union 
leaders turn to cooperation out of sincere conviction that doing so serves 
the best interests of both their employees and their communities. 
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Cooperation is almost always the result of local-level initiatives by 
union and management decision makers. It ordinarily occurs below the 
radar screen of national-level organizations. When cooperation occurs, 
however, it requires that the parties develop structures that will help en-
sure its success. Training and education programs for representatives on 
both sides of the table are one example. The parties must also be pre-
pared to create new mechanisms of support, such as nontraditional 
approaches to conflict resolution like grievance mediation, joint commit-
tees to handle topics like the quality of work life and the improvement of 
service delivery, and forums that encourage employee participation in 
decision making. 
Taken together, the chapters in this volume suggest the following 
conclusions about labor-management cooperation in the public sector: 
• The vast majority of statutes that provide collective bargaining 
rights for public sector employees do not promote or support 
cooperative labor-management relationships that potentially 
would benefit both the parties and their communities. 
• Where a common desire exists, however, parties have been able to 
work around the statutory framework to participate in a regular-
ized regime of collaborative problem solving. 
• Politics can significantly affect the context and the specific rela-
tionship, creating instability and uncertainty that interfere with 
establishing and operating collaborative relationships—or even 
productive traditional relationships. 
• National union leaders, who must juggle many forces affecting 
their unions' growth and influence, in general respect the cooper-
ative approach but remain wary of the risks associated with it. 
• With the possible exception of some federal sector unions, teacher 
unions, and school board associations, active support for collabora-
tion occurs primarily at the local level, spurred by a local crisis, 
new leadership, or dissatisfaction with bargaining outcomes. The 
use of cooperation, although still limited to a minority of relation-
ships, appears to be growing at the local level and. has proved to be 
highly valuable to the parties on both sides of the table and to the 
citizens who, as a consequence, receive improved public services. 
• Some state boards and the entire FMCS encourage and support 
cooperative efforts, but other boards take a conservative approach, 
emphasizing in their mission the legal adjudication of rights rather 
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than improvement in the quality of the relationship. Members of 
these boards, and many union and management representatives, 
believe they do not receive sufficient resources to support their core 
functions, let alone to promote labor-management cooperation. 
• In specific localities, however, legislators and local executives have 
found that cooperative relationships have not only resulted in 
improved public services but have also helped them fulfill their 
other responsibihties to their constituents. 
• Trends in union membership, largely the consequence of changes 
in the economy and the workforce, have resulted in public sector 
union membership now constituting nearly half of the total num-
ber of union members in the United States. Public sector union 
members tend to have more education and to occupy more-highly 
skilled and more-professional jobs than their private sector coun-
terparts. The demographics of public sector membership, accord-
ingly, make the use of traditional union-management relationships 
even more problematic there than in the private sector. As the 
number of knowledge workers in the public sector grows, the 
need to explore new approaches to union-management relations 
will be even more pressing. 
• Workers rather than managers are often the constant figures in 
schools, firehouses, social service agencies, and other public sector 
organizations. Given this characteristic of some spheres of public 
sector employment, unions may want to consider adopting more of 
a "guild" role, focusing as much on guaranteeing and improving 
the quality of public services as on the improvement of their mem-
bers' terms and conditions of employment. 
• The inclusion of supervisors in public sector unions and bargain-
ing units may result in fewer difficulties than some experts had 
previously expected. 
• The pressure to privatize, which is strongly advocated by the cur-
rent presidential administration—along with limits on taxes—will 
continue to create cost and quality pressures. Under traditional 
relationships, conflict and resistance to service improvement are 
the typical response. Cooperative, service-oriented models, per-
haps in combination with appropriate political strategies, offer a 
way to counter that response to these pressures. 
We hope that this volume contributes to both the knowledge of, and 
debate about, the value of cooperative service-oriented relationships 
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and the barriers to their use. We also hope that this model will be more 
fully explored in the future, against the backdrop of major changes 
affecting labor union membership and the rights and reasonable expec-
tations of citizens, workers, and managers in the public sector. 
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Notes 
1
 The most recent IRRA research volume devoted to public sector employment 
relations was edited by Belman, Gunderson, and Hyatt (1996). Earlier volumes 
included two editions of the volume edited by Aaron, Najita, and Stern, one pub-
lished in 1979 and the other in 1988. 
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2
 In this paragraph we have summarized comments made by Parker Denaco, 
Pauline Kinsella, and Linda Hanson, each of whom is or was a member or senior 
staff of a state board or commission, at a conference, "The Future of Public Sector 
Labor-Management Relations: Working Together to Achieve Excellence for the 
Twenty-First Century," held on April 13-15, 2000, at the Chicago-Kent College of 
Law. The editors of this volume were the organizers of that conference. 
3
 Some scholars, particularly economists, are skeptical about the degree to which 
any legal regime can significantly influence behavior. Many of them believe that 
although the law may have its intended desirable effects, those effects are often out-
weighed by the unintended, and often undesirable, consequences of statutory regula-
tion. This ongoing debate about the efficacy of government regulation is the focus of 
an earlier IRRA research volume (Kaufman 1997). 
4
 For a discussion of the role of champions in introducing change in an organiza-
tion, see Lipsky, Seeber, and Fincher (2003, especially pp. 135-37} and Ulrich (1997). 
5
 The text of the New Mexico law can be found on the New Mexico Legislature's 
website at <http://legis.state.nm.us/>. See also, "New Mexico Governor Signs Mea-
sure Reinstating Public Employee Bargaining" (2003: A-6). 
The act is known as the Personnel System Reform Act of 2002. See State of 
Washington, House Bill 1268 (2001). For the provisions pertaining to subcontracting, 
see Section 208. See also, "State Labor and Employment Laws Enacted in 2002" 
(2003: S-51-52). 
7
 Richard Hurd reported on this development in his presentation on January 5, 
2003, at the 55th Annual Meeting of the Industrial Relations Research Association 
held in Washington, D.C. 
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